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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
B. L. CURTIS, C. H. CURTIS, and 
J. S. SMITH, doing business under 
the firm name and style of MAIN 
REALTY COMPANY, and HEBER 
G. TAYLOR and L. D. GARDNER, 
doing business as TAYLOR-GARD-
NER, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
REED MORTENSEN and ANN 
M·ORTENSEN, his wife, 
Respondents. 
Civil No. 8051 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now the defendants and respondents and 
respectfully petition the court for a rehearing of the 
above case and of the decision made and filed March 1, 
1954; and state and allege that the court has erred in the 
fallowing particulars : 
1. In purporting to find facts not found by the trial 
court to be such, and with reference to which there was 
an issue of fact, and in basing its decision thereon, con-
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2 
trary to the jurisdictional limitation of powers of this 
<'OUrt; 
2. In disregarding the facts found by the trial court 
as the basis for its decision. 
3. In failing to apply to this case the law as estab-
ilshed by this court and other jurisdictions. 
4. In purporting to find facts on issues of fact not 
decided by the trial court and presently undecided in 
this case, and which is the exclusive function of the trial 
court and beyond the jurisdiction of this court. 
ARGUMENT 
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. IN PURPORTING TO FIND FACTS NOT FOUND BY 
THE TRIAL COURT TO BE SUCH, AND WITH REFERENCE 
TO WHI·CH THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT, AND IN 
BASING ITS DECISION THEREON, CONTRARY TO THE 
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION OF POWERS OF THIS 
COURT. 
2. IN DISREGARDING THE FACTS FOUND BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION. 
3. IN FAILING TO APPLY TO THIS CASE THE LAW 
AS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND OTHER JURIS-
DICTIONS. 
These points may well be presented together since 
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3 
they involve the same basic questions. 
\Vhen \Ye \\"Tote our original brief 1n this case we 
candidly stated we were at a loss to ascertain the theory 
on which appellants were attacking the judgment. It was 
not evident in the brief of appellants whether they were 
attacking the finding of fact as being unsupported by 
the evidence or whether they were accepting the facts 
and arguing the law on the basis of the facts found. We 
did not anticipate that this court would treat the case as 
one in equity and find its ovvn facts to suit the decision 
that it felt the case deserved. 
This is a law case. Under the provisions of Article 
VIII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution, this court has no juris-
diction to find facts on disputed questions of fact. That 
is the exclusive function and right of the court of original 
jurisdiction as the trier of the facts. 
It seems unnecessary to cite authorities as to this 
limitation on the jurisdiction of this court in law cases. 
-It is clearly stated in the Constitution, and this court has 
on many occasions recognized that it has no such right. 
We submit them only in the hope that by refreshing its 
collective mind on this subject this court vvill remember 
that if it finds facts in order to decide law cases it does 
so in violation of its limited power in law cases. 
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t·ourt 1nay not substitute its findings of fact for those 
or the trial court. 
l) id the brokers find buyers who were ready, able 
and \villing- to buy on sellers' terms~ The trial court said 
tl1('~· <lid not. True, it \vas stipulated that the purported 
buyers wen· financially able to buy, but that is only one 
part of the forHlula. The other two parts are the impor-
tant ones. They were not ready and willing to buy, except 
on condition that the transaction be optional with the 
buyers to go ahead and buy or not, as the buyers should 
determine after seeing the operating statement, and 
upon the condition that in the meantime the $5000 deposit 
ren1ain under control of the buyers. 
The sellers' terms which sellers were willing to 
accept were $5000 down and a binding agreement to buy 
with a forfeiture clause of the $5000 if the buyers did not 
go through with the deal. 
The buyers' terms were: No binding agreement until 
after they looked at the operating statement; in the mean-
time the $5000 to be held by buyers' agent. 
That is what the trial court found to be the facts. 
But this court says those are not the facts. Maybe a dif~ 
ferent trial ·court would agree with this court, but it is 
not for this court to say what the facts were. 
The trial court, reading the telegram from the 
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5 
Lyman vs. Totvn of Price, 63 Utah 90, 222 Pc. 
599· 
' 
Osborn vs. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435; 
In re Alexanders Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 
Pac. 2d 432; 
Sine vs. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 Utah 238, 
147 Pac. 2nd 875; 
Horsley vs. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 Pac. 
2d 592. 
The following basic facts were found by this court 
as the foundation for its decision: 
(a) That the brokers found purchasers who were 
ready and willing to buy on the sellers' terms; 
(b) That the reason the sale was not consummated 
was because the sellers changed their minds about selling; 
(c) That the demand that the operating statement 
contain a showing of $20,000 as gross income was nothing 
more than a suggestion of the brokers made after the 
deal was made that it would be "nice" to have the state-
ment so show. 
None of those purported basic facts were found by 
the trial court and the facts found by the trial court are 
exactly to the contrary. Of.course, if there is no evidence 
to sustain the findings of the trial court, this court may 
reverse the case for a new trial of those issues, but this 
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buyers to their agent, found that the signer of the con-
tnu·t o11 behalf of huyers had no authority to sign on 
bPhalf of th<· buy<~rs excepting on condition that the whole 
d(~al should be subject to acceptance or rejection by the 
lnt~·pr:--; aft<~r reeeipt of the operating statement. On the 
other hand, this (~ourt says the ·buyers were ready and 
\\' i lling- 1 o buy. The· evid(~nce sustains the trial court find-
ing. Th<· buyers were willing and ready to buy only if 
the <.leal pleased them after receipt of the operating 
statement. 
This court makes much of the fact that the buyers 
brought a suit for specific performance and says in effect 
that this shows conclusively that the buyers were ready 
and willing to buy. There was no evidence that such was 
the case. They were ready and willing to do what they 
were obligated to do under the earnest money receipt, 
which was nothing. Now here, in either case, did buyers 
offer to or obligate themselves to buy. The utmost that 
could be inferred from their amended complaint (Ex. 
9) was that they were willing to look at the operating 
statement. The findings of fact in the first case and in 
this case are to the effect that the only thing the buyers 
were willing to do was to buy if it pleased them after 
receipt of the operating statement. Both trial courts so 
found the facts to be. 
Counsel in this case promised the trial court that 
they would produce evidence showing that Rheinstro1n 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
and Spencer were willing to vvaive the operating state-
ment and buy without any strings attached. They asked 
us to stipulate that buyers \vere willing and ready ·to 
buy \vith no strings attached. We refused to so stipulate. 
They then said that they would so show by competent 
evidence; but they never did. We ask this court to read 
this part of the record (Tr. 57, 58). That is where tl:e 
evidence stood. Had the buyers been ready and willing 
to make a binding agreement, as this court has assumed 
to be the fact, for the purpose of its decision, a different 
situation would have been presented. You would then 
have had a new offer to buy on sellers' terms, but they 
did not do that; they elected to stand "pat" on the first 
deal and that vvas the deal they tried to specifically en-
force, the one conditional upon approval of the statement. 
The court finds as a fact that the reason the deal 
fell through was because the sellers changed their minds; 
that the demand to show $20,000 as the gross incon1e in 
the operating statement was an afterthought and nothing 
more than a suggestion that it would be "nice" to have 
it so show. 
The trial court did not so find and the evidence did 
not so show. There certainly was at least a dispute on 
that point. Both trial courts found that the operating 
statement was an important and crucial part of the deal; 
that the whole transaction hinged on it; and that the 
buyers insisted on it. Both of the Mortensens testified 
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that the buyers, through their agent, Torkelson, de-
lnanded that the statement show $20,000 gross income. 
Torkelson finally admitted that he demanded it. The 
l\1ortensens testified that it was this phase of the case 
that (·a used them to rescind; that they would not be a 
party to a fraudulent representation. How can this court 
find facts different from the trial court on this material 
issue and say that the sellers simply changed their minds~ 
\Ve request the court to read Torkelson's evidence (Tr. 
98), if this court has any doubt about the evidence to 
sustain the trial court, and see what he finally said on 
this point. It certainly was no afterthought. It was a 
demand, so intended and so understood and so found by 
two trial courts to be material parts of the deal. We 
respectfully urge that this court transcended its lawful 
jurisdiction in finding those basic facts and in disregard-
ing the facts found by the trial court. 
The undisputed and controlling facts in this case 
are identical in principle with those in Reich et ux vs. 
Christopulos, ______ Utah ______ , 256 Pac. 2d 238. The only 
difference was that in that case the buyers gave a worth-
less check to the broker, whereas in this case buyers 
represented that they had paid $5000 down, which they 
had not. The earnest money receipt in both cases was a 
whited sepulcher. It bore on its face the badge of legality 
but beneath the surface, to which the trial courts looked, 
it was dead. There was no life in it because the $5000 had 
not in fact been paid and because the agent signing for 
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buyers had actual authority different from that appear-
ing on the paper. Everything that Justice Crockett said 
in the R,eich case as to the applicable principles of law 
has applicability here. vVe urge the court to review the 
authorities cited in our original brief. A broker must 
give the seller at least the righ't to accept or reject a 
firm and binding offer to buy. So long as the matter is 
still in the negotiation stage, which this was, the broker 
has not earned his pay; and so long as the buyer attaches 
strings to his offer, has his fingers crossed, it is still only 
negotiation-not a deal. 
The last Pacific Advance Sheet for March 19, 1954, 
brings a California case so much like this one in facts 
and principle that we take the liberty of quoting from 
it at length. The case is Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 
266 Pac. 2d 856. There, as here, the buyer and seller 
signed an earnest money receipt, subject to consideration 
and approval of operating and other statements to be 
submitted and furnished by the seller. Those statements 
produced problems and the deal fell through. The broker 
sued the seller for his commission. The court said the 
broker had not finished his job. As long as the buyer 
produced by him had it within his power to back out of 
the deal he was not willing and ready to buy so as to 
entitle the broker to his commission. We qnote from that 
case and urge the court to read it all. 
"Plaintiff agrees that it is entitled to recover 
only if it found a buyer ready, able·, and vvilling 
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to buy on terms acceptable to defendant. It argues 
. ' however, that N eidorf was ready, able, and will-
ing to buy on the terms of his written offer and 
that defendant accepted such terms by signing 
the agr<~ement of January 27, 1951; consequently, 
she cannot question the readiness, willingness, and 
a hili ty of the procured purchaser to perform 
a<'tording to the terms of his offer. * * * * * 
. "Before a broker is entitled to compensation, 
the negotiations which he is authorized to make 
1nust be concluded or conducted to the state where, 
as to all the material or essential terms of the 
sale, there is a meeting of the minds or an agree-
ment between the principal and the customer pro-
duced by him; but if the principal and the custo-
mer are unable to come to terms, the broker can-
not recover. * * * 
"Although the terms of a .contract need not 
be stated in the minutest details, it is· requisite 
to enforceability that it must evidence a meeting 
of the minds upon the essential features of the 
agreement, and that the scope of the duty and 
limits of acceptable performance be at least suf-
ficiently defined to provide a rational basis for 
the assessment of damages. * * * *Where the par-
ties assume to make a contract in which one's 
promise is the consideration for the promise by 
the other, the promises must be mutual. To be 
obligatory on either party, the contract must be 
mutual and reciprocal in its obligations. One who 
promises to do a thing ·only if it pleases him, is 
not bound to perforrn. Central ·Oil Co. v. South-
ern Refining Co., 154 Cal. 165, 97 P. 177; 12 Cal. 
Jur. 2d 317, sec. 114. Where a contract imposes 
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no definite obligation on one party to perform, 
it lacks mutuality of obligation. It is elementary 
that where performance· is optional with one of 
the parties no enforceable obligation exists. * * * 
This type of promise is illusory and does not 
result in a binding agreement even if uncondi-
tionally accepted. 
"The terms of the agreement gave Neidorf 
two opportunities to decline to purchase the prop-
erty. The Neidorf offer of J'anuary 27, 1951, 
expressly provided that it was 'subject to' two 
special conditions: 1) 'O.P.A. Rent statements 
to be approved by Buyer,' and 2) 'subject to 
buyer's inspection and approval of all apart-
ments.' These conditions had the effect of reserv-
ing to the offeror the unrestricted discretion to 
decide whether to be bound or not, even in the 
event of an unconditional acceptance by the of-
feree. No standard or basis for these 'approvals' 
is ·established. No hint is given as to what criteria, 
if any, are to determine whether the O.P.A. rent 
statements and all the apartments will be ap-
proved by the buyer. What are the rent state-
ments to contain or show for the offeror's approval 
to be forthcoming~ What are the apartments to 
have and consist of in order to be 'approved'~ Are 
they to satisfy him as to size, furnishings, decor~ 
Who is to judge whether he is satisfied with the 
statements and apartments~ Only the buyer him-
self. It is entirely a subjective matter. Ellis v. 
Klaff, 96 Cal. A pp. 2d 4 71, 4 78, 216 P. 2d 15. No 
one could compel N eidorf to be satisfied for he 
reserved these approvals to himself without limi-
tation or restriction. The standard 'as to the 
satisfaction of a reasonable person' does not apply 
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where the performance involves a matter depend-
ent on judgment. Melton v. Story, 113 Cal. App. 
609, 613, 298 P. 1032; 12 Cal. J ur. 2d 440, sec. 219. 
''By simply refusing to approve the O.P.A. 
statements or the apartments, Neidorf could with-
draw frorn the agreement. Actually, the Neidorf 
'offer' was not an offer to enter into an agreement, 
but an offer to enter into an agreement if he later 
wished to do so. This illusory pro~nise is the 
only offer that was submitted by plaintiff to 
defendant. When by the terms of an agreement 
the owner of property binds himself to sell on 
specified terms, and leaves it discretionary with 
the other party to the contract whether he will" or 
will not buy, it constitutes simply an optional 
contract. Johnson v. Clark, 17 4 Cal. 582, 586, 163 
P. 1004. This was all that the contract amounted 
to in this case. 
• • • • :t: 
"To entitle a broker to a commission, the 
acceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase must 
be unconditional. 
:t: • • • • 
"Plaintiff's commission was dependent on a 
binding contract between N eidorf and defendant. 
It chose to protect its commission by a contract 
between other parties. Since they failed to enter 
into a binding contract, it is not entitled to 
recover." 
The principles involved in the above case are those 
which this court in all of the cases cited by us in our 
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original brief has found to be the law of this State. 
This court in Little l 1S. Gorman, 39 Utah 63, 114 Pac. 
321, refused to allow a broker to recover his commission 
so long as there was no meeting of the minds between 
the seller and buyer. Where either party has the right 
to refuse or deny the binding effect of the deal, it is 
still negotiation-not a firm offer. 
See also Best v. Kelly, (Wash.) 155 Pac. 2d 794. 
We respectfully submit that this court erred in sub-
stituting its own findings of fact for those of two trial 
courts and in failing to apply the law to the facts of this 
case. 
4. IN PURPORTING TO FIND FACTS ON ISSUES OF 
FACT NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND PRES-
ENTLY UNDECIDED IN THIS CASE, AND WHICH IS THE 
EXCLUSIVE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. 
Closely related to the points above discussed with 
reference to finding of fact by this court is the undeter-
mined issue raised by the affirmative defense of defend-
ants, to-wit, that the plaintiffs, by their representations 
to the buyers, involved defendants in a fraudulent trans-
action without authority, and that plaintiffs were insist-
ing on defendants being a party thereto. That issue was 
not determined by the trial court because it deemed it 
unnecessary to do so in view of its finding that the 
plaintiffs had not presented to defendants a binding 
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offer for their acceptance. Defendants testified that they 
did not know that such representations had been made, 
did not authorize them to be made, did not know that 
the operating statement was to contain such representa-
tions until rl,orkelson, plaintiff's agent, demanded it after 
the earnest ntoney receipt v.ras signed. They further testi-
fied that they did not know until later that the $5000 
had not been paid and that Torkelson had only limited 
authority to sign for the Luyers. Plaintiffs testified to 
the contrary so an issue of fact was presented. 
That certainly was a good defense to any action by 
the agent for commissions if believed by the trial court. 
An agent has no authority to make representations on 
behalf of the principal, exposing the principal to liability 
for fraud, without authority from the principal. In this 
State it is statutory. (Sec. 61-2-11). 
Has this court also by its decision assumed to decide 
that disputed issue of fact~ That issue is certainly open 
to be tried. 
The direction to the trial court to proceed in accord-
ance with the decision seems to mean that this court has 
assumed to decide all of the issues of fact, those found 
by the trial court and those not found. 
It certainly seems very clear that this court over-
looked the fact that there are certain issues raised by 
the answer which were not decided by the trial court 
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because it seemed unnecessary to do so, but if the trial 
court were in error as to its ruling on the law there still 
remains the further defense presented but not decided; 
unless, of course, this court has also decided that issue 
of fact in this case. 
We respectfully urge that this case should be recon-
sidered by this court and this petition for rehearing 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON AND MANGUM 
By H. A. RICH 
ALLEN AND DANSIE 
By W. DOUGLAS ALLEN 
R-OBERT REES DANSIE 
Attorneys for Responden~s 
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